The authors’ failure to even consider whether any countries might be interested in supporting Washington’s grand strategy is emblematic of an approach that disregards the actual desires of people in the region.įinally, it may be that distributed operations or similar operational concepts, such as those that the U.S. And yet, figuring out where else in the Western Pacific the United States would actually base additional troops, much less ballistic missiles, is not merely one consideration among many but the entire ballgame.
Even though Colby and Slocombe acknowledge that “the real questions will be where, how, and when,” and that “getting host nation agreement for such basing will be a tough lift,” they leave those questions unanswered. Second, if existing bases are out, the question then turns to which other countries might be willing to host this enhanced forward presence, and here the answers are brief: almost none. Coupled with the increased attractiveness of these locations as targets - now containing an even juicier sampling of American forces - it would be of little additional value, if not outright counterproductive, to double down on existing locations. Even if distance were not an issue, without significant infrastructure enhancements these facilities’ current rates of work would remain the same despite the increased demand: Aircraft sortie generation rates would be unimproved, naval ship repair timelines flat, and troops unable to redeploy any faster than they can today. bases in the region are well within range of Chinese land-based missiles already (the entirety of Japan and Southeast Asia), or else too far from the theater to bring significant concentrated firepower to bear (e.g., Diego Garcia). First, even if large additional deployments were possible to the bases and airfields the United States already used, their utility would be limited. force presence in the Western Pacific ought to be a non-starter, given the very real limitations on existing and potential new basing locations alike.
The Problem with “More” in the Western Pacific Instead, Washington should underline its ability to contain a crisis and respond in due course, relying in part on existing alliances to prompt more urgent responses if necessary. This concept presupposes a relatively large-scale first strike to which the United States would respond, but, should conflict with China erupt, it is likely to happen in a much less calculated and coordinated fashion. It is also worth reconsidering the “contact/blunt/surge/homeland” global operating model of the 2018 National Defense Strategy, particularly the “blunt” layer in which prepositioned forces would supposedly absorb strikes and defend against a hypothetical attack by China. Specifically, the Navy should recapitalize the guided-missile submarine fleet with a new purpose-built class and continue to enhance long-range strike capabilities across the surface fleet. An emphasis on platforms that do not require new basing rights would offer a more mobile and survivable posture.
Given the very real limitations on deploying additional personnel or platforms to existing forward bases or to aspirational new ones, Washington ought to adopt a more peripheral approach to conflict management in the region. and partner bases would not meaningfully alter the strategic calculus, and new weapons systems like theater missiles are particularly unlikely to be welcomed with open arms. At the same time, merely increasing troop numbers at existing U.S. troops at all, much less the quantity and type of forces for which Colby and Slocombe advocate. But the very idea of “sufficient” foreign posture is an illusion: No additional countries in Asia (with the exception of tiny Palau) are interested in hosting U.S. They add their voices to a years-long chorus of commentators who insist that only by “strengthen its Western Pacific forward posture” and stationing vast numbers of manpower and materiel in-theater - proving the ability to resist “Chinese aggression” - will any degree of deterrence be secured. forces, particularly land-based missiles, in the Western Pacific. The authors are the latest to sign onto the illusory prospect of a large-scale forward positioning of U.S. Unfortunately, in their article, “ The State of (Deterrence by) Denial,” Elbridge Colby and Walter Slocombe propose to buy many more boxes of real-life military forces while disregarding where exactly they might fit. At some point, the prudent course of action is to figure out what to do with the ones you’ve got rather than simply try to shove more into your existing storage space - for the sake of not just your wallet but to preserve the domestic peace. It’s a problem familiar to any wargamer: Sure, you can buy more and more boxes of soldiers and tanks and missiles, but, eventually, you run out of places to store them.